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Abstract
The imbalance between supply and demand of organs for transplant will not be fully solved 
by changes to the allocation system. Improved organ donation and utilization must be 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
accomplished through critical reassessment of OPO performance as a partnership between 
transplant centers, OPOs and community hospitals. The continued discussion on changes to 
the organ distribution system should be based on patient-centeredness, enhanced 
transparency, improved models and metrics. Focusing too heavily on geography without 
consideration for the other factors at play risks oversimplification of this complex issue.
Organ distribution is entangled in both legal and ethical debates and influenced by the 
financial viability of health institutions and our nation’s sense of unity. As Lynch et al [1] 
point out, it is critical that participants in this important discussion agree on basic 
principles and priorities for policy development. Their core arguments are 1) Donor service 
area (DSA) is the cornerstone of organ availability; 2) Local placement of organs improves utilization; 
3) The current role of DSA is fit for exaptation; 4) Vulnerable populations are disadvantaged by using 
MELD as metric for broader allocation. We will examine each of these and also put forth several 
tenets which are important for this discussion: 1) The metric for allocation of an organ 
should not be commingled with a geographic area of distribution; 2) Competition generated 
through increased geographic sharing is good in marketplaces and leads to increased 
productivity; 3) Changes to allocation policy should enhance transparency and allow for re-
evaluation of models and rules used; 4) Patients should be at the center of the discussion 
about organ distribution rather than DSA, organ procurement organizations(OPOs) or 
transplant centers 
It is important to understand that the debate about organ access and utilization is 
not new and has been ongoing since liver transplant became the primary therapy for end-
stage liver disease.  Twenty years ago policy makers were charged with addressing issues 
of allocation in liver transplantation. The Institute of Medicine was tasked by Congress to 
evaluate the impact of regulations on organ procurement and transplantation. The 
committee did not include any practicing solid organ transplant surgeons to avoid direct 
conflicts of interests. The report emphasized that the “system…not only has to be fair, but 
its fairness must be readily perceived by the public”[2]. The report also recognized that the 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
system “can be improved by enlarging the current organ allocation areas to include larger 
populations.” [2] Organ allocation based on the MELD score enabled increased 
transparency in the system and thus increased the perception of fairness by stakeholders. 
Changes in organ distribution should aim for the same. 
1.1 Local (DSA) donation is the cornerstone of organ availability
The authors don’t make a clear argument here. Certainly the relationship between OPOs and hospitals 
within a DSA is critical to conversion of potential donors to actual donors.   However, the authors fail 
to acknowledge that the primary driver of organ availability is the incidence of eligible 
deaths in the population relative to the prevalence of end organ disease [3].  Efficiency and 
effort of hospital staff and OPOs increase donation, but the benefit of those efforts is not 
exclusively local. (See Figure 1). Their argument comparing the performance of two OPOs 
does not support their argument. 
1.2 Ultra-local (center) utilization converts potential to reality
We should remove the modifier ultra-local, as any utilization converts potential to reality. 
The variance in utilization between programs within a DSA does not contradict that 
disparity is a feature of geography and policy. The authors acknowledge the example of 
Texas but fail to note that patients in Fort Worth are transplanted at a significantly higher 
MELD than patients thirty miles away in Dallas. Eleven of the 58 OPOs are not contiguous, 
skipping counties and patients (See Figure 2). There are many examples but recent data 
published by UNOS show that in Milwaukee the MMaT (Median MELD at Transplant) was 
35 while in the same state patients in another DSA had MMaT of 30. This represents a 
significant difference in access 
(https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/2812/mts_distribution_document.pdf). 
1.3 The current role of DSA is fit for exaptation 
Lynch et al argue DSAs are fit for exaptation; although not intended to define limits for organ 
distribution, they currently apply to practice patterns and align with state borders and are 
therefore appropriate units of distribution. Exaptation is the idea that one trait is repurposed for 
another to play another role. In one of the earliest papers, about exaptation, Gould and Vrba 
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argued that a trait often required significant new adaptations to better fill its new role[4]. For 
example, calcium phosphates laid down in the skin of early vertebrates for storing phosphates 
were changed in a substantial way to become bone and function of support. The example of 
exaptation used by Lynch et al, the transformation of feathers in primitive birds into the 
feathers useful for flight in modern birds took millions of years of changes and evolution.  
The fact that a system or trait can be repurposed does not mean the same, as it is the best 
system for that purpose. We believe our community can imagine a more efficient process 
for organ distribution than exaptation of DSA.
1.4 Vulnerable populations are disadvantaged by using MELD as metric for broader allocation
Lynch et al further argue that vulnerable populations are disadvantaged by using MELD as metric for 
broader allocation. We agree with the authors that the sickest patients are those at highest 
risk of dying from their liver disease, and the vulnerability of patients living a long distance 
from their transplant center or in an area with a high Community Health Score (CHS) has 
merit[5]. As they point out, both are independently associated with increased mortality.  
We agree that policies should consider the impact on disadvantaged populations. 
The metric for allocation of an organ should not be comingled with geographic area of 
distribution.
We agree that the performance of the OPOs within a DSA can influence organ availability, 
and OPOs have a critical task in increasing organs available for transplant. OPOs without a 
local liver program still generate liver donations for transplant by sharing outside their 
DSA. The authors further state that variability in organ availability is demonstrated by regional 
differences in the median meld at transplant (MMAT). We would argue that the variability of the 
MMAT around the country reflects differences in both the supply and demand of organs. Even 
with equivalent organ supply, variability would persist based on prevalence of liver disease and 
population density. Given the differences in demand, shouldn’t patients with similar risk of pre-
transplant mortality have equal access to life saving organs? By overlaying issues of supply and 
demand the authors obfuscate the metrics of disease severity for organ allocation. MMAT can be 
influenced by surgical practices, including the ability to successfully add patients to the waitlist 
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and use of marginal organs for patients with lower MELD scores.  MELD has undergone addition 
of sodium to improve capture of pre-transplant mortality risk[6]. Exceptions points have 
undergone many changes and are scheduled to significant changes in the coming year. While 
allocation/distribution policies and OPO efficiency both contribute to saving lives for 
patients with liver disease, the two should not be conflated as they are separate challenges 
with separate solutions.
Competition generated through increased geographic sharing is a good and leads to increased 
productivity. 
We agree that successful transplantation requires center willingness, but utilization-or 
willingness-is increased with the addition of a competing center. While individual centers 
may differ in their selection criteria for age, quality, etc., the relationship between 
competition and organ transplantation bends towards increased competition.  Increasing 
geographic sharing increases competition[7, 8] and has the potential to improve utilization 
of organs and OPO performance by allowing the OPOs to be more aggressive in placement 
of organs.[9] Regional sharing has resulted in increased liver transplants, fewer discards, 
and lower waitlist mortality as well as increased organ utilization by OPOs, particularly of 
marginal allografts [10].  Similarly, competition among transplant centers within a DSA 
has been shown to lead to increased utilization of higher risk organs[11]. As the authors 
point out post-transplant survival is not necessarily negatively impacted by increased 
organ utilization, and increased volume at aggressive centers likely allows use of higher 
risk organs without significant effect on overall graft and patient survival[12]. Prior work 
has modeled geographic density along with market competition to describe the 
associations between market competition, geography, transplantation volume, and 
outcomes [9, 13]. Rather than abandon the idea of increased sharing, we propose further 
work is needed in this area to develop policies that increase demand for marginal livers, 
and adjustment of SRTR models for OPO performance to incorporate market competition. 
Changes to allocation policy should enhance transparency and allow for re-evaluation of models 
and rules used.  
Using variables that are easily understood enhances evaluation and transparency. As the 
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IOM stated twenty ago, the perception of fairness is critical. Few argue that the system 
today is easily understood by patients or providers.   A system where organs are 
distributed over a defined distance is both measureable and modifiable. 
Policies to improve organ donation rates, increase accuracy of metrics for allocation, 
introduction of competition into the markets and standardize waitlist practices may be 
more effective if pursued in parallel rather than series, with improvement in one aspect 
expected to ultimately lead to some change in the others.  
Patients should be the center of the discussion about organ distribution rather than DSA, 
OPOs or transplant centers. 
The barriers to high quality care experienced by vulnerable and disadvantaged populations 
are multifaceted. It is tempting when designing policy to try to fix multiple needs of an 
underserved population. [3] Distance from a transplant center has been shown to 
negatively influence outcomes, but increased geographic sharing is neither the cause of nor 
solution to this problem. Furthermore, the Community Health Score is an indicator of 
population vulnerability influenced by numerous factors other than geographic location 
including race, income, education level, health literacy, nutrition, etc. While CHS may be 
associated with waitlist mortality, changes to organ distribution policy will not necessarily 
improve the overall health of these vulnerable communities. One route to improving access 
to liver transplant may be improving the metric for broader allocation, in this case MELD, so 
as to more accurately reflect waitlist mortality rather than maintain an unbalanced and 
inequitable system. For patients to remain at the center of the debate, the fundamental 
principle must remain to transplant the sickest patients first. A patient centered policy 
would not leave behind the 94.5% patients who list in their DSA due to Medicaid 
boundaries[1]. It is equally important to avoid making the issues so complex and 
overlapping that inequalities in the current system are maintained due to fear of change. 
This is neither transparent nor easily re-evaluable. We urge the adoption of policies that 
are both. Otherwise, we find ourselves just supporting the status quo over any change. 
Conclusions
Lynch et al make several strong points. We agree metrics for organ allocation should 
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be objective and minimize unacceptable consequences across other domains. Improvement 
in DSA and OPO performance is a critical part of improving access to transplantation for 
patients, and clearly there is room to improve our utilization of organs within the current 
system. However, although incentives to increase organ donation may be instituted and 
communicated locally, the burden of this task should be shared by all members of the 
transplant community with the primary goal of protecting patients, who should not be held 
responsible for poor performing OPOs. In addition, we must realize that our process for the 
recovery and transport livers is evolving, and both increased travel by recovery teams and 
increased use of local teams are likely inevitable. Rather than abandon efforts to improve 
regional and national distribution of organs, we should make better use of the substantial 
data and talent within the transplant community to develop and iteratively model 
innovative approaches that account for population density, care standardization, aberrant 
geography, socio-economics, access to transplantation, and local community engagement in 
organ donation. 
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Figure legends
Figure 1. Location of centers transplanting kidneys procured by Life Link of Georgia (GALL) 
from 7/1/2017 to 6/30/2018
Figure 2. Non-contiguous organ procurement organizations in Ohio (A) Illinois/Missouri 
(B) Mississippi/Tennessee/Arkansas (C) and Wisconsin (D)
References
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
1. Lynch, R.J., et al., Moving past 'think local, act global:' a perspective on geographic disparity. Am 
J Transplant, 2018. IN PRESS - THIS ISSUE
2. Policy, C.o.O.P.a.T., in Organ Procurement and Transplantation: Assessing Current Policies and 
the Potential Impact of the DHHS Final Rule. 1999, National Academies Press: Washington (DC).
3. Ladin, K., G. Zhang, and D.W. Hanto, Geographic Disparities in Liver Availability: Accidents of 
Geography, or Consequences of Poor Social Policy? Am J Transplant, 2017. 17(9): p. 2277-2284.
4. Gould, S.J. and E.S. Vrba, Exaptation-A Missing Term in the Science of Form. Paleobiology, 1982. 
8(1): p. 4-15.
5. Ross, K., et al., Sociodemographic Determinants of Waitlist and Posttransplant Survival Among 
End-Stage Liver Disease Patients. Am J Transplant, 2017. 17(11): p. 2879-2889.
6. Kim, W.R., et al., Hyponatremia and mortality among patients on the liver-transplant waiting 
list. N Engl J Med, 2008. 359(10): p. 1018-26.
7. Cho, P.S., et al., Competitive Market Analysis of Transplant Centers and Discrepancy of Wait-
Listing of Recipients for Kidney Transplantation. Int J Organ Transplant Med, 2015. 6(4): p. 141-9.
8. Garonzik-Wang, J.M., et al., The aggressive phenotype revisited: utilization of higher-risk liver 
allografts. Am J Transplant, 2013. 13(4): p. 936-942.
9. Adler, J.T., et al., Is Donor Service Area Market Competition Associated With Organ Procurement 
Organization Performance? Transplantation, 2016. 100(6): p. 1349-55.
10. Massie, A.B., et al., Early changes in liver distribution following implementation of Share 35. Am J 
Transplant, 2015. 15(3): p. 659-67.
11. Halldorson, J.B., et al., Center competition and outcomes following liver transplantation. Liver 
Transpl, 2013. 19(1): p. 96-104.
12. Halazun, K.J., et al., Expanding the Margins: High Volume Utilization of Marginal Liver Grafts 
Among >2000 Liver Transplants at a Single Institution. Ann Surg, 2017. 266(3): p. 441-449.
13. Adler, J.T., et al., Temporal Analysis of Market Competition and Density in Renal Transplantation 
Volume and Outcome. Transplantation, 2016. 100(3): p. 670-7.
Figure 1. 
 
 
ajt_15362_f1.docx
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
Figure 2 
 
 
ajt_15362_f2.docx
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
